Socks5

Chaining SOCKS5 UDP relays: self-loops, SSRF, and the amplification that isn't

Final follow-up post debunking the “open UDP relay = DDoS amplifier” fear: chaining launders origin but de-amplifies at the target, self-looping only DoSes the relay itself, loopback forwarding is a UDP SSRF, and even a paid commercial proxy fails the RFC 1928 §6 source check — every behavior reframed as a single-packet detection fingerprint.

Auth on TCP, open on UDP: the SOCKS5 relays scanners can't see

Final version of the SOCKS5 open-UDP-relay teardown: de-quantified the scan-list phrasing, aligned a log comment to first-person voice, and thinned one forward-reference scaffold, with all tables, numbers, RFC references, and the “signals, not weapons” defensive framing preserved verbatim.